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Abstract 
The aim of the special issue is to investigate through a comparative lens the impact of the recent 
economic crisis and consequent austerity measures on party competition and political representation 
in Europe. All six contributions focus on the substance of political conflict and provide new insights 
about the impact of the crisis on (a) the policy agendas of political parties, (b) the relationship between 
government and opposition parties, and (c) on how citizens’ preferences are represented by political 
parties. Theoretically, the contributions link the literatures on party competition, responsiveness, 
agenda-setting, and social movements. Empirically, they provide new empirical material, in particular 
on the countries in Southern Europe which were hard hit by the crisis. This introduction briefly 
discusses the rationale of the special issue and summarizes the focus and findings of the six 
contributions. 
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Rationale and scope of the special issue  
This special issue of Party Politics examines whether and how party competition and political 
representation in Europe have been affected by the Great Recession and the subsequent Euro crisis. 
We define political representation as the relationship between political demand and supply aimed at 
transferring popular preferences, including grievances, to the upper levels of the political system 
(Denters et al. 2011). Overall, the special issue provides new arguments and empirical evidence on 
the changes in the representative linkages between citizens’ preferences and the policy proposals of 
parties in times of economic crisis. More specifically, the individual contributions offer important 
insights on three broad research questions:  
• What is the impact of the crisis on the policy agendas of parties? Has the crisis reduced the 
policy alternatives on offer to citizens? 
• Has the crisis changed the relationship between government and opposition parties both 
during elections and in parliament? 
• Are citizens’ preferences represented by political parties? How did citizens perceive and 
respond to the crisis of representation?  
The contributions pay special attention to the countries in Southern Europe (in particular, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) which have found themselves at the ‘eye of the storm’. In our 
opinion, studying Southern Europe is like looking at the impact of the crisis with a magnifying glass. 
However, the research presented in this special issue is inclusive of countries in other parts of Europe 
as to locate the findings in a broader perspective and to assess potential similarities and differences 
with the situation in Southern Europe. 
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As is well documented, almost all European countries experienced the first shock of the Great 
Recession, but the subsequent Euro crisis and its political repercussions were most pronounced in the 
South (on the development of the crisis, see Copelovitch et al. 2016). The Southern European 
countries under scrutiny ended up facing several political challenges because of the crisis and the 
politics of austerity prescribed by their international lenders (e.g., Morlino and Raniolo 2017; Freire 
et al. 2014). These measures had a constraining impact on the policy agendas of national governments 
and incumbent parties seemed ever more caught between responsibility in terms of fulfilling 
commitments to their EU partners and responsiveness to an increasingly-distant public opinion (on 
this tension, see Mair 2013; Bardi et al. 2014). As foreseen by the economic voting literature, these 
dynamics translated into massive losses of incumbents (e.g., Giuliani and Massari 2017; Hernández 
and Kriesi 2016; Bartels 2014). Yet, mainly in the first crisis elections, they translated into a landslide 
for the main opposition parties. By contrast, the voters in the hard-hit countries tended to punish all 
mainstream parties at later stages and turned to alternative offers (e.g., Hobolt and Tilley 2016). In 
Greece, Italy, and Spain new parties made their way onto the scene, mostly (but not only) carrying a 
new anti-elite and anti-European populist agenda (e.g., Bosco and Verney 2016; Bosch and Duràn 
2017; della Porta et al. 2017; Vidal 2017). These processes were accompanied by growing public 
disaffection with national and European institutions (e.g., Braun and Tausendpfund 2014; Clements 
et al. 2014), a contraction of the political agenda (e.g., Singer 2013; Traber et al. 2017), wider political 
protest in the streets (e.g., della Porta 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2015), and intensified conflicts over 
the future of European integration (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2017; Hutter et al. 2016). 
The Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the changing political supply and demand since the onset of the 
Great Recession in fall 2008. Most importantly, Figure 1 highlights that the supply in the electoral 
arena has not only become more volatile and fragmented in Southern Europe during the crisis but we 
also observe increasingly polarized conflicts over a more contracted political agenda (the latter is 
indicated by the ever more homogenous partisan supply regarding the issues being emphasized). 
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Figure 2 indicates related trends for the political demand side. While we observe no general polarizing 
trend for the public opinion, the plot on the most important issues that the countries face highlight 
that, again, we observe the most pronounced trends for Southern Europe where the respondents 
became increasingly concerned with economic issues which ultimately crowd out other concerns. At 
the same time, trust in key actors and institutions of representative democracy, political parties and 
national parliaments, decreased substantially. These motivating figures should mainly highlight that 
both aspects of representation (demand and supply) are in flux and that we should pay attention to 
the content or substance of the conflicts at stake. 
 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
The scope of the special issue adds to the burgeoning ‘crisis literature’ as it innovates in at least 
four ways: First, the special issue covers different, often disconnected strands of the political 
representation literature by focusing on party politics, public opinion, social movements and 
legislative behavior. In addition, past studies have tended to focus either on the demand- or the supply-
side of political representation in the context of the crisis (Auel and Hoenig 2014, Lewis-Beck, Costa 
Lobo and Bellucci 2012, Magalhães 2014, Zamora-Kapoor and Coller 2014). This special issue 
examines both sides as well as their interactions. Second, in theoretical terms, the contributions 
highlight how certain “taken-for-granted” assumptions on the structure and dynamics of party 
competition and on political representation are affected by a crisis situation. By doing so, the 
contributions take up Robert’s (2017) call for comparative work on the diverging political fallout of 
the crisis considering trends which were underway long before the crisis came about. Third, the 
special issue systematically takes into account what Laffan (2016) labelled “multi-level politics”, i.e., 
the close connections between political conflict dynamics across domestic arenas and on the European 
level. Fourth, the focus of all papers is comparative which allows moving beyond the prevalent focus 
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on single-case studies, particularly prevalent for studies on Southern Europe (see, e.g., Lewis-Beck 
et al. 2012; Magalhães 2014; Bosco and Verney 2012, 2013). To do so, the individual contributions 
have invested a lot in combining important existing datasets and generating newly collected sources 
of data that allows systematic comparisons across the countries of Southern Europe and beyond, 
ranging from updated data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR), the Comparative 
Agendas Project (CAP), elite and mass surveys but also original mass media data on election 
campaigns and protest events. 
 
Individual contributions: Focus and main findings 
The special issue covers six individual contributions. Three contributions address the question of 
parties’ programmatic responses during the crisis, moving beyond the traditional left-right dimension. 
The article by Hutter, Kriesi and Vidal examines the emerging structuring of political conflict in four 
Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) during the Euro crisis. To 
understand the changing political spaces, they argue that one needs to consider that the countries in 
the South of Europe simultaneously faced an economic and a political crisis. Based on their original 
media data, the authors show that all four countries under scrutiny saw increasingly salient conflicts 
over both austerity and ‘old-vs.-new’ politics. Moreover, the two types of economic and political 
conflicts tend to align in the emerging political spaces, and this alignment is strongest when the 
mainstream left is in opposition. In government, the mainstream left was forced to implement 
austerity policies, whereas it attempted to adopt economically more left-wing positions and capitalize 
on the issues of political renewal when in opposition. 
Bremer’s article focuses on the differentiated programmatic response of the mainstream left 
to the economic crisis in fifteen Western European countries. Although the long-term consequences 
of the crisis are yet to fully emerge, the mainstream left has certainly lost support across Europe and 
been thrown into a deep identity crisis. To understand these dynamics, the paper empirically examines 
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whether and to what extent social democratic parties changed their economic policy positions. Based 
on the same type of data as Hutter et al., the article shows that social democratic parties shifted their 
general positions towards the left during the crisis. However, this is only part of the story. While they 
defended the welfare state and opposed economic liberalism after the start of the financial crisis, they 
simultaneously supported budgetary rigor. This highlights the increasing tensions within the 
programmatic platforms of social democratic parties and is symptomatic of their reinforced identity 
crisis. Social democratic parties assembled policy packages at national elections containing specific 
and diverging proposals on economic policy that did not align neatly on a single left-right dimension.  
In their article, Charalambous, Conti, and Pedrazzani examine parties’ programmatic 
responses on another crucial issue, namely, European integration. Their point of departure is the 
expectation that when crisis-like macro-economic changes occur, they can affect party positions very 
seriously as they alter the nexus of opportunities and constraints in the domestic political 
environment. In Southern Europe, the EU played the role of chief manager of the Euro crisis and of 
the main agent imposing austerity, so the authors have analyzed whether party stances on the EU 
have changed after the Great Recession. Based on expert and elite surveys for Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain, the article indicates that shifts in party positions are more pronounced where short-term 
vote-seeking logics prevail, but less visible among elected party officials who serve in public office. 
It shows that the crisis has heightened the divisions within parties, i.e., divisions between those party 
officials who are closer to Europe’s elite and those who are closer to a party’s electoral base. As a 
result, the well-known elite-mass divide on the EU is also reflected inside political parties, a 
phenomenon that has become more acute during the economic crisis.  
The article by Clements, Nanou and Real-Dato, a large-N study of EU member states, focuses 
on the changing nature of party-voter linkages during the economic crisis. More specifically, the 
contribution focuses on party responsiveness on the left-right dimension between 2002-2015. Based 
on party manifesto and European Social Survey data, it investigates whether party shifts are a direct 
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response to the pressures of economic conditions or are more affected by changes in the preferences 
of the median voter. The authors find that the economic crisis has made parties in Europe less 
responsive to public opinion on the left-right dimension. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced 
for incumbent parties. These parties have, in effect, been caught between the conflicting demands for 
responsiveness to citizens’ preferences and the responsibility to reform and retrench as demanded by 
external institutions and actors. The contribution shows that conditions of prolonged and severe 
economic crisis do severely affect the nature of party-voter linkages over left-right politics.  
The last two articles complement the broad picture of party-voter linkages by Clements et al. 
and the focus on the programmatic response of parties by looking more closely at the dynamics of 
representation in-between elections. The article by Borghetto and Russo focuses on party 
representation between elections by looking at parliamentary activities in Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
in the crisis years. Combining data on party manifestos, Eurobarometer surveys and parliamentary 
questions, the authors find support for the claim that both manifestos and citizens’ priorities are 
relevant predictors of how parties distribute attention across issues in-between elections. 
Furthermore, the authors show that when citizens’ priorities get more focused on the economy 
because of the economic downturn, parties become more responsive to citizens' priorities in their 
parliamentary activities. This finding holds for parties belonging to the majority or opposition camp, 
albeit the latter are generally more responsive to public opinion than the former.  
The final article by Altiparmakis and Lorenzini examines yet another crucial arena where 
political demands are articulated in-between elections, i.e., the protest arena. More specifically, it 
traces the ups and downs in protest mobilization in four Southern Europe countries (again, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Based on a new semi-automated protest event dataset, the authors 
highlight that the beginning of the Euro crisis saw protest waves of differing intensity in all four 
countries which were triggered by widespread dissatisfaction with austerity. Thus, the rhythm of 
protest does not simply follow economic trends but is rather triggered by specific institutional events. 
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In other words, bailouts and domestic austerity bills were the focal events around which protest was 
organized. In addition, the article shows an important link between patterns of opposition in the 
protest and the electoral arena as national elections acted as protest deflators in cases where an anti-
austerity partisan alternative emerged, partially solving the emerging crisis of representation. 
 
Lessons on political representation  
Over time, economic liberalization and European integration – gradually shifting more power and 
policy-making influence to actors beyond the nation-state – have impacted on and constrained the 
policy agendas of government, the programs of parties, and the choices available to voters. The 
European economic crisis – particularly severe in its impact and protracted in its duration in Southern 
Europe – was an exogenous shock that intensified and made more acute these external constraints on 
political parties’ ability to formulate, compete on and implement policies situated within broader left-
right conflict. For political parties and citizens in the Eurozone and in the EU more generally, the 
crisis brought to the surface the realization that parties within member states are constrained as policy 
actors. Within the economic crisis, this realization tended to focus on the austerity politics and 
structural reforms imposed on and enacted within countries of the Eurozone, but it provided a more 
general compelling example of the effects of the incremental process of European integration – across 
an ever-increasing range of policies - on the (in)ability of political parties to offer meaningful choices 
to citizens at national elections.  
Considering the severe challenges to democratic representation induced by the economic 
crisis, the contributions to the special issue highlight that parties have proved to be adaptive actors 
which have attempted to accommodate their strategies to the pressures originating from this 
exogenous shock. The political situation in those countries most severely affected by the economic 
crisis appears far from stable, but at the same time the capacity of national political systems to absorb 
the stress caused by the crisis should not be underestimated. During the crisis, parties have been 
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severely tested but have been critical vehicles of shock absorption, and expectations about their 
adaptive capacity appears vindicated in these critical years (Panebianco 1988). As Dalton et al. noted: 
‘Parties are nothing if not survivors’ (2011: 230). Furthermore, they have a great capacity for 
adaptation – to new challenges and new conditions. Dalton et al. rightly observe that parties ‘are 
strategic actors, surveying the political landscape, evaluating threats, and responding in such a way 
as to resolve them’ (p. 231). During the crisis, more broadly, party systems showed their adaptive 
qualities through the role of new and older challenger parties vying to channel citizens’ protest within 
democratic representation, as well as through strategic adaptation of the policy programs by 
mainstream parties.  
Nonetheless, the contributions also underline that mainstream parties, especially those in 
office during the crisis, tended to prioritize the business of governing – that is, being responsible – by 
setting out and implementing austerity and structural reforms in response to external constraints. The 
challenger parties, in contrast, focused on expressing political opposition to austerity politics, 
unresponsive national elites and to the role played by external actors in managing the policy response 
to the crisis. As Mair (2011) has observed, this broad division of functions between parties played 
out in Irish politics under conditions of crisis. This has also been replicated, to a greater or lesser 
degree, in the countries in Southern Europe to which the special issue paid most attention. The crisis 
also put to the test the longstanding commitment of many mainstream parties – on both the center-
left and center-right – to the project of European integration, at a time of sustained pressure on the 
EU’s internal cohesion and unity and declining public support for the supranational project (Hobolt, 
2015). The crisis also brings into sharper relief existing debates over the EU’s democratic credentials, 
in particular how citizens can participate – as Føllesdal and Hix (2006) note – in meaningful and 
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Figure 1: The changing partisan supply in times of crisis (party system features) 
 
Note: The figure shows how volatility, fragmentation and issue competition have developed on the political supply side 
of Southern Europe and all other EU member states from 2000 to 2015. The solid trend lines are based on locally 
weighted smoothing (LOWESS) for the two groups of countries. Volatility refers to the total volatility and is based on 
the dataset by Hernández and Kriesi (2016). Fragmentation is measured by the effective number of parties (vote shares) 
and is based on the values in the comparative manifesto dataset (CMP/MARPOR). Issue polarization and homogeneity 
are also measured based on the CMP/MARPOR data. Polarization is calculated based on the rile left-right scale and 
Dalton’s (2008) formula; homogeneity refers to the overlap in issue emphases across the parties and is based on the 
formula introduced by Franzmann (2008).  
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Figure 2: The changing public demand in times of crisis (public opinion) 
 
Note: The figure shows how polarization, salience, and trust levels have developed on the political demand side in 
Southern Europe and all other EU member states from 2004 to 2015. The solid trend lines are based on locally weighted 
smoothing (LOWESS) for the two groups of countries. All data except those that derive from the most important issue 
question are based on an integrated dataset of the Eurobarometer produced by the POLCON project. The most important 
issue information was compiled by the authors from the Eurobarometer Interactive 
website: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index. Polarization is measured as the 
standard deviation in left-right self-placements on a ten point-scale (missing for 2012/13). Salience is measured by the 
answers to the most important issues facing the country (maximum two answers) (missing for 2011). We show the sum 
of respondents that declared that the economic situation and/or unemployment were the most important issues (scale from 
0 to 200 percent). Distrust refers to the share of respondents that tend to distrust political parties and the national 
parliament, respectively. 
